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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the evidence on lying or deception presented in Gneezy (2005,
American Economic Review). We argue that Gneezy’s data cannot reject the hypothesis
that people are one of two kinds: either a person will never lie, or a person will lie whenever
she prefers the outcome obtained by lying over the outcome obtained by telling the truth. This
implies that so long as lying induces a preferred outcome over truth-telling, a person’s decision
of whether to lie may be completely insensitive to other changes in the induced outcomes, such
as exactly how much she monetarily gains relative to how much she hurts an anonymous partner.
We run new but similar experiments to those of Gneezy in order to test this hypothesis. We find
that our data cannot reject this hypothesis either, but we also discover substantial differences
in behavior between our subjects and Gneezy’s subjects.
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I. Introduction
It is by now fairly well-established in economics that people are motivated not just by material self-
interest, but also by “social” goals (e.g., Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt, 1999; James Andreoni and
John Miller, 2002). Also important, but less established, is the notion that a person’s preferences
may have a procedural component: how allocations come to be can matter above and beyond just
what the allocations are (Amartya Sen, 1997). That is, process matters beyond consequences.
This paper focuses on preferences over a particular kind of procedure that can affect economic
outcomes: lying. Specifically, we are interested in whether, ceteris paribus, people suffer a disutility
from telling a lie; and if so, how the disutility varies with factors such as the degree of lying and the
consequences of lying. The existence and nature of an aversion to lying can matter a great deal
for economic analysis. As Thomas Schelling (1960) noted, if declarations such as “cross-my-heart”
are even partially credible, various strategic situations are drastically altered. Navin Kartik, Marco
Ottaviani, and Francesco Squintani (2006) show how the presence of lying aversion can result in
significantly greater amounts of information transmission in sender-receiver games than the classic
analysis of “cheap talk” by Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982).1 The implications for contract
design and mechanism design are also important (Jeffrey Lacker and John Weinberg, 1989; Raymond
Deneckere and Sergei Severinov, 2003).
In the economics literature, Uri Gneezy (2005) represents the first attempt to detect experimen-
tally the nature of people’s aversion to lying. The basic idea is to compare how people behave in two
different settings: a deception game where a person can tell the truth and obtain allocation A, or
lie and obtain allocation B; or an otherwise identical dictator game where a person simply chooses
between allocations A or B. Each allocation, X ∈ {A,B}, consists of a monetary payment, xs, to
the person making the choice, and a payment, xo, to an anonymous other person (‘s’ for “self” and
‘o’ for “other”). The allocations are such that bs > as and ao > bo, i.e. relative to A, B contains
more money for the sender/dictator and less money for the partner. Thus, B may be termed the
selfish allocation whereas A is the generous one.
In the absence of social preferences or cost of lying, a person would simply choose allocation
B in the dictator game, and lie in the deception game. However, if we admit the possibility of
social preferences and costs of lying, it is natural to endow a person with a cost of lying parameter,
cs ≥ 0, and a utility function over allocations, us(xs, xo). Ignoring indifference, a person will choose
allocation B in the dictator game if and only if us(bs, bo) > us(as, ao); a person will choose to lie in
the deception game if and only if us(bs, bo)− cs > us(as, ao). Unscrupulous agents would be those
with cs = 0, wholly ethical agents would be those with cs =∞, and intermediate types who tradeoff
the costs and benefits of lying would be those with cs ∈ (0,∞). The question of interest is: what
is the distribution of cs in the population?
Gneezy finds that a significant fraction of people possess cs > 0: the fraction of subjects who
choose the selfish allocation B in the dictator game is significantly higher than the fraction who make
1See Hongbin Cai and Joseph Tao-Yi Wang (2006) for experimental evidence in this vein, and Ying Chen (2005)
and Kartik (2005) for related theoretical analyses.
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the same choice in the deception game by lying. We fully agree with this conclusion, and believe it
to be important, for the reasons mentioned earlier. By varying the monetary payments associated
with the two allocations, Gneezy (p. 385) then claims the following “main empirical finding.”
Gneezy’s Main Result. “People not only care about their own gain from lying; they also are
sensitive to the harm that lying may cause the other side.” (p. 385) In the experiments, fewer people
lie when the monetary loss from lying is higher for their partner, but the monetary gain remains the
same for them. Similarly, fewer people lie when their own monetary gain decreases, while the loss
for their partner remains the same.
We argue in this paper that to the extent this result is supported by Gneezy’s data, it derives
purely from whether or not a subject prefers allocation B over allocation A—i.e. whether or not
us(bs, bo) > us(as, ao)—and says nothing about a subject’s aversion to lying, cs. That is, we argue
that although Gneezy’s Main Result suggests that some people possess a non-degenerate cost of
lying, cs ∈ (0,∞), and perform a cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether to lie, this interpretation
is not supported by his data. More precisely, we will show that Gneezy’s data is consistent with
the following hypothesis.2
Hypothesis. Conditional on preferring the outcome from lying over the outcome from truth-
telling, a person is sensitive to neither her own [monetary] gain from lying, nor how much [monetary]
harm she causes the other side.
Notice that aside from the preface of “preferring the outcome from lying”, the rest of the Hypoth-
esis seems quite at odds with Gneezy’s Result. However, the Hypothesis is in fact consistent with
a literal interpretation of Gneezy’s Result, and we are thus not disputing a narrow interpretation of
his claim. We will argue in Section III that what makes Gneezy’s Result literally valid—and yet
consistent with the Hypothesis—is precisely that a significant fraction of people prefer the outcome
from lying to truth-telling in some experimental treatment(s), but not in others. But this by itself
is merely evidence of social preferences, which as noted earlier, is a well-established phenomenon.
It has nothing to do inherently with lying aversion, since it applies just as well when the allocations
are chosen directly in the dictator game.
When thinking about questions regarding aversion to lying—whether someone possesses it, and
how this varies with outcomes, say—we contend that one implicitly assumes that the outcome from
lying is preferred to the outcome from truth-telling in the first place.3 Interpreted under this
implicit backdrop, Gneezy’s Result implies that there are (a significant number of) people who
prefer allocation B1 to A1 and allocation B2 to A2, are willing to lie to obtain B1 rather than A1,
2It should be emphasized that we are not taking a position on the veracity of the Hypothesis; our claim is only
that it is not rejected by Gneezy’s data.
3This presumes that a person does not derive pleasure from lying, and has no other considerations apart from
preferences over final allocations and any displeasure from lying. While these presumptions may not always be
satisfied, our point here is only that this is the intuitive point of departure when thinking about aversion to lying.
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yet not willing to lie to obtain B2 rather than A2. If this were the case, it would indeed be evidence
that a significant proportion of people have intermediate costs of lying, rejecting the Hypothesis that
people either have cs = 0 or cs =∞. Since we will show that Gneezy’s data are consistent with the
Hypothesis, it follows that this interpretation is not supported by his data. In fact, we will show
that Gneezy’s data is consistent with an even stronger version of the hypothesis, viz., one cannot
reject that 50 percent of people lie whenever they prefer the outcome from lying versus truth-telling,
and 50 percent of people never lie.
That the Hypothesis is consistent with Gneezy’s data does not imply that it is an accurate
description of people’s behavior. It is an important hypothesis to test because if it is right, it means
that people can be categorized as one of two types: either they are “ethical” and never lie, or they
are “economic” and lie whenever they prefer the allocation obtained by lying. If it is wrong, then
a richer model of aversion to lying is needed.4
Accordingly, we ran a similar set of experiments to Gneezy’s with the primary objective of testing
the Hypothesis. Our secondary objective was to test the robustness of his findings, including how
deception occurs in different cultures: his experiments were in Israel, we ran ours in Spain. Following
Gneezy’s design, we ran treatments of both the dictator game and deception game, but used a within-
subject design so that players played both games (unlike Gneezy, where players played only one or
the other); this permits us to make more precise inferences regarding people’s decisions to lie relative
to their preferences over allocations. We also used treatments that are more polarized than Gneezy’s
in terms of how much the dictator or sender can gain by implementing one allocation over another.
This, in principle, should make it more likely to reject the Hypothesis, if the Hypothesis is wrong,
while it should have no effect if the Hypothesis is correct. In this sense, our design reduces the
possibility of type II errors. Further details of our design are postponed to Section IV.
Our data confirm Gneezy’s finding that there is a statistically significant level of lying aversion.
However, with regards to how this aversion to lying varies with consequences, even our data cannot
reject the notion that so long as a person prefers the outcome from lying, the decision to lie is
independent of how much she gains and how much her partner loses, i.e. we are unable to reject
the Hypothesis we set out to test. While this may mean that the Hypothesis is in fact a reasonable
description of people’s motivations, our analysis reveals that the inability to reject it stems in large
part from the fact that our subjects differ quite systematically from Gneezy’s: most importantly,
our subjects expect their lies to work significantly less often (and hence lie less), and moreover, these
expectations are justified on the basis of partner responses.5
4On a related note, see Gary Charness and Martin Dufwenberg (2005) for an application of “guilt aversion” theory
to the current context.
5After completing our experiments, we became aware of the work of Matthias Sutter (2006), who also documents
in follow-up experiments to Gneezy that many subjects may not expect their lies to be believed. The focus of our
papers are distinct, however. Sutter’s (2006) main concern is whether people who tell the truth in fact intend to
deceive their partner; he does not run the control dictator games as Gneezy did and we do, and hence cannot speak
to people’s preferences over final outcomes.
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II. The Gneezy Experiments
Gneezy (2005) runs three treatments of a two-player experiment where there are only two possible
outcomes, Ai and Bi, in each treatment i = 1, 2, 3. Although the actual choice between the options
was to be made by player two, only player one was informed about the monetary consequences of
each option. The only information player two had about the payoffs prior to making her choice was
the message that player one decided to send. This message could either be “Option Ai will earn you
more money than option Bi” or “Option Bi will earn you more money than option Ai”.
In all three treatments, option Ai gives a lower monetary payoff to player one and a higher
monetary payoff to player two than option Bi. (It is important to emphasize that player two did
not know that.) Therefore, sending the second message can be considered as telling a lie, whereas
sending the first message can be considered as telling the truth. The different monetary allocations
(in dollars) in the three treatments were as follows, where as usual, a pair (x, y) indicates that player
one would receive x and player two would receive y:
A1 = (5, 6) and B1 = (6, 5);
A2 = (5, 15) and B2 = (6, 5);
A3 = (5, 15) and B3 = (15, 5).
A fundamental issue when thinking about whether a player one would lie or tell the truth is
what beliefs she holds about her partner’s responses to her messages. Gneezy provides evidence
suggesting that people generally expect their recommendations to be followed, i.e. they expect their
partner to choose the option that they say will earn the partner more money. In this sense, lies
are expected to work. While we return to the issue of beliefs in Section V, we are content for now
to accept Gneezy’s interpretation about his subjects’ beliefs, and will follow him in analyzing the
situation as effectively a decision-theoretic problem for subjects in the role of player one.
In order to determine the extent to which the results of these deception games reflect an aversion
to lying as opposed to preferences over monetary distributions, Gneezy used a control dictator game
in which player one chooses between two options and where player two has no choice. Again,
three treatments were run, corresponding to exactly the same options of the three treatments of the
deception games.6
Each treatment of the deception game was run with 75 pairs of subjects. Each treatment of the
dictator game was run with 50 pairs (consisting of different subjects from the deception game). We
summarize the results in the following table, whose content is a replica of Table 2 from Gneezy.
6In order to make the comparison between the two games as fair as possible, it was announced to player one that
his chosen option would be implemented with probability 0.8, while the other option would be implemented with
probability 0.2. The reason for this was that in the deception game about 80 percent of the subjects in the role of
player two follow the “recommendation” of player one, and that this was anticipated (on average) by the subjects in
the role of player one.
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Table 1—The percentage of player 1’s who chose option B
Treatment 1 2 3
Deception 0.36 0.17 0.52
Dictator 0.66 0.42 0.90
The differences between the proportions in the Deception row are statistically significant (at
the level of p = 0.024). Similarly, the differences between the proportions in the Dictator row
are statistically significant (at the level of p < 0.01). Finally, for each treatment i = 1, 2, 3 the
difference between the proportions of subjects choosing option Bi in the deception game and the
dictator game is statistically significant (at the level p = 0.01). Gneezy concludes from this last point
that people’s choices reflect nonconsequentialist preferences, since they treat the choice between Ai
and Bi differently depending on whether it is an “innocent” choice or whether a lie has to be used
to obtain it. We fully agree with this conclusion. In fact, when pooling over all three treatments
one finds an even much higher significance level for the difference in proportions of lies and innocent
choices (in a Chi-square test, X2 = 33.21, df= 1, p = 0.0000).
Gneezy’s (p. 385) asserts his “main empirical finding” to be that “people not only care about
their own gain from lying; they also are sensitive to the harm that lying may cause the other
side.” This conclusion is presumably drawn by comparing the percentage of liars across the three
deception game treatments. As discussed in the introduction, our primary concern is to what
extent this conclusion is warranted. In the following section, we argue that his data cannot reject
a model in which some fraction (e.g. half) of the population will say anything—be it the truth or
a lie—to obtain their preferred outcome, whereas the remainder (e.g. the other half) are always
honest. This implies that Gneezy’s conclusion is only warranted to the extent that people’s social
preferences influence whether they actually prefer the outcome from lying relative to truth-telling,
independent of any aversion to lying. Conditional on preferring the outcome from lying, a person
may be completely insensitive to how much he gains or how much his partner loses from the lie.
III. Conditional Probabilities of Lying
The dictator control games show clearly that many subjects do not choose based only on their
own monetary payoff; instead, many people take into account their partner’s monetary payoff. In
particular, out of 150 dictators, only 66 percent chose the option that gave them the highest monetary
payoff; more than one third of the dictators chose to be generous, by which we mean choosing the
option that gives the partner the highest monetary payoff. By revealed preference, a generous
dictator prefers option A over B, although option B yields her a strictly higher monetary payoff.
Surely, a person who prefers A over B will not tell a lie in order to obtain the less preferred option,
B.7 Only those who can shift the outcome in their preferred direction by lying need deliberate
whether to lie or not. Unfortunately, we do not observe which or how many of the subjects prefer
7Two caveats should be emphasized: first, recall that following Gneezy, we are assuming that messages will be
followed by player two’s; second, we assume that subjects do not derive inherent pleasure from lying.
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option B over A (independently of lying) in the deception game treatments. This is because there
are no subjects who played both dictator and deception games, as the experimental design was
“between subjects”, not “within subjects”. However, the control dictator games corresponding to
treatment i = 1, 2, 3 do give us an estimate of the percentage of people in the population who prefer
option Bi over Ai, which we call selfish behavior. Let qi denote the percentage of selfish people
in treatment i, and pi denote the fraction of liars in treatment i. Assuming that the subjects for
each treatment of either game were drawn randomly from the same population distribution, qi is
then an estimate for the fraction of subjects who have any incentive to lie at all in deception game
treatment i, and pi represents what fraction actually do lie. In each treatment i, the ratio pi/qi is
therefore an estimate of the fraction of people who lie conditional on having an incentive to do so,
or for short, the conditional probability of lying. If the Hypothesis in the introduction is correct,
then there should be no significant difference across treatments of this ratio. Even more strongly, if
the conditional probability of lying is not statistically different from one half in any treatment, then
one cannot reject the hypothesis that 50 percent of subjects are “ethical” (never lie) and 50 percent
are “economic” (lie whenever they prefer the outcome from lying).
In treatment 1, 66 percent of the subjects revealed a preference for B1 over A1 in the dictator
game. In the deception game, 36 percent of the subjects lied; hence, the fraction of people who
lie conditional on having an incentive to do so, is about 54 percent (≈ 36/66). Doing similar
calculations for the other treatments leads to the results that are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2—The estimated conditional probabilities
of lying when having an incentive to do so.
Treatment 1 2 3
Conditional probability 0.545 0.413 0.578
Table 2 clearly suggests that there does not seem to be a significant difference in the conditional
probability of lying between treatments 1 and 3. Moreover, the difference in conditional probability
of lying between treatments 2 and 3 is far less stark than the difference in absolute probability (cf.
Table 1). In fact, it is straightforward to verify that none of the conditional probability differences
are significant at the p = 0.10 level. We use the normal approximation to the binomial distribution
to calculate p-values from a one-tailed test of the equality of the conditional probabilities of lying.
The p-value for the comparison between treatments 2 and 3 equals p = 0.104. For the comparison
between treatments 1 and 2 it equals p = 0.171. Finally, the comparison between treatments 1
and 3 yields a p-value of p = 0.382. (Appendix 1 provides detailed calculations.) We conclude
that one cannot reject the hypothesis (at the 10 percent level) that the conditional probabilities of
lying in treatment 1 is no different from the conditional probability of lying in treatments 2 and
3. It is important to emphasize that our test takes appropriately into account that the number of
subjects who have an incentive to lie in each treatment is a random variable.8 In fact, for none
8For example, it would be a mistake to assume that in treatment 2, exactly 32 subjects have an incentive to lie
(42 percent of 75), and in treatment 3 exactly 68 subjects (90 percent of 75) have an incentive to lie. Under this
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of the treatments can one reject the hypothesis that this conditional probability equals one half.9
Thus, one cannot reject either of the following: 50 percent of people never lie and 50 percent lie
whenever they prefer the outcome from lying; alternatively, a person who prefers the outcome from
lying flips a fair coin to decide whether to lie or not.
We would like to note that the magnitudes of the conditional probabilities in Table 2 do suggest
that the Hypothesis is incorrect: given that a person has an incentive to lie, the person is more
likely to do so when her own monetary gain is bigger and when the monetary harm caused to the
opponent is smaller. In this sense, it is suggestive that Gneezy’s main result is in fact correct. The
problem is simply that the differences in these conditional probability estimates are not statistically
significant given the sample sizes.
IV. New Data
In an attempt to test the Hypothesis more carefully, we ran a set of new experiments; to permit
comparison to Gneezy (2005), we retained the basic tenets of his design. The experiments were run
over three sessions at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in Spain; subjects were college students
from various disciplines. Our subjects were given written instructions in Spanish; Appendices 2 and
3 provide English translations. There are four important differences in our design with respect to
Gneezy’s.
First, we had all subjects play both the deception game and the dictator game, unlike in Gneezy’s
experiment, where subjects played only one or the other game. In our design, both games are played
with the same set of monetary payoffs, but each player is matched with a different, anonymous
partner for each. (We paid subjects for only one of the games, determined by the flip of a coin
after all decisions were taken by all subjects—thus there is no feedback.) The reason we chose this
within subject design is that it allows us to directly compare any subject’s behavior in the deception
game with her preference over allocations as revealed by her choice in the dictator game.10 With
Gneezy’s design, such comparisons can only be done at the aggregate level over all subjects, as we
have done in the previous section. But this necessarily adds some noise to the estimates and leads
erroneous assumption one would then test for the equality of proportions of 13/32 and 39/68, and one would find in
a one-tailed test p = 0.059 < 0.104.
9Instead of using three pairwise comparisons, one can also test directly whether the conditional probability of
lying is the same in all three treatments. Assuming that the true probabilities of having incentives to lie are given
by the estimates from the dictator games, one can perform a Chi-square goodness-of-fit test by comparing observed
frequencies of lies with expected frequencies of lies, given the null-hypothesis of equal conditional probabilities of lying.
This gives X2 = 1.697 with df= 2 and p = 0.43, which means we cannot reject the hypothesis that all conditional
probabilities are the same. Similarly, we can test whether all conditional probabilities are equal to one half. This
yields X2 = 2.398 with df= 2 and p = 0.30. Again, we cannot reject the null-hypothesis of all conditional probabilities
being equal to one half. An alternative way of analyzing Gneezy’s data is to run a regression of the fraction of lies or
selfish choices on (i) the difference between treatments, (ii) the difference between dictator and deception game, and
(iii) the difference (between two treatments) in differences (between dictator and deception game). It turns out that
the coefficient of “difference in differences” is insignificant, even at a 20 percent level (see Appendix 1). This is the
analog of conditional probabilities of lying being constant over different treatments.
10One potential concern with our design is that of order effects: does a player’s behavior change depending on
whether she plays the dictator game or deception game first? To account for this, we randomized subjects to play in
both orders—deception game first or dictator game first—and found no significant order effects.
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to higher p-values, and thus to more type II errors of not rejecting the Hypothesis when it is in fact
wrong. (See also fn. 8.)
Second, we conducted the experiment using the strategy method (Reinhard Selten, 1967) for
player two (receiver) in the deception game: rather than telling them what the message sent by
player one (sender) is and asking them to pick an option based on it, we asked them to indicate
which option they would pick contingent on each of the two possible messages from player one.
The reason we chose this approach is that it allows us to directly observe a receiver’s strategy.
In particular, our design can identify the subjects who choose to ignore the message altogether—
something that is impossible to detect using the direct response method employed by Gneezy.11
Third, we asked all subjects in the role of player one (sender) in the deception game to indicate
their beliefs about what their anonymous partner would do in response to the message they chose.12
Finally, we conducted two different treatments, which we label 4 and 5 to preserve comparison
with Gneezy’s three treatments. In our treatments, the monetary payoffs, in Euros, were as follows:
A4 = (4, 12) and B4 = (5, 4);
A5 = (4, 5) and B5 = (12, 4).
Treatment 4 is similar to Gneezy’s treatment 2 in the sense that option B entails a small gain for
player one and a big loss for player two, relative to option A. Treatment 5 is substantially distinct
from any of the three treatments in Gneezy because option B results in a big gain for player one
and only a small loss for player two. If lying induces outcome B whereas telling the truth induces
outcome A (as is suggested by Gneezy’s data), and if the decision whether to lie or not depends on
the relative gains and losses even conditional on preferring the outcome from lying, then one would
expect to find that the proportion of lies among the selfish subjects in treatment 5 is significantly
higher than in treatment 4. In other words, by using two treatments that are very polarized we
increase the chance of rejecting the Hypothesis whenever the Hypothesis is wrong. That is, this
aspect of our design further reduces type II errors.
Due to our within subject design, subjects in the role of player one can be divided into four
categories based upon their preferences (selfish or generous) and their message (lie or truth). For
example, a subject who chooses B in the dictator game but sends the message that A earns the
receiver more money than B is classified as “Selfish and Truth”. Table 3 reports the observed
frequencies of the four possible types in each treatment.
11There is no conclusive evidence on whether subjects behave differently in experiments that use the strategy
method versus the direct response method. For example, Jordi Brandts and Gary Charness (2000) find no difference in
behavior across the two methods in simple 2x2 complete information sequential games, whereas Brandts and Charness
(2003) do find some differences in an experiment involving communication about intentions and costly retributions.
In our setting, since receivers have no information whatsoever about the monetary allocations, there doesn’t seem
to be any a priori reason to expect differences in behavior from the two methods. Moreover, the simplicity of the
setting faced by receivers mitigates concerns about strategies being overly complex objects for players to deal with.
12We did not pay subjects for accuracy of beliefs. Paying subjects for accuracy could lead subjects to diversify
risks and to not play optimally against their beliefs or to not report beliefs truthfully.
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Table 3—The number of liars and selfish subjects
Treatment 4 5
Selfish and Liar 19 14
Selfish and Truth 25 16
Generous and Liar 3 1
Generous and Truth 11 1
Total 58 32
As expected, the proportion of selfish subjects in treatment 5 (30/32≈ 0.94) is significantly higher
than in treatment 4 (44/58 ≈ 0.76). (A one sided test of equality of proportions yields p = 0.02.)
It is noteworthy that despite the similarity of treatments 2 and 4, the proportion of selfish subjects
in treatment 4 (44/58 ≈ 0.76) is significantly higher than in treatment 2 (21/50 = 0.42). (A one
sided test of equality of proportions yields p < 0.001.) The data also show that the proportion of
lies in the deception game (41/90 ≈ 0.46) is significantly lower than the proportion of selfish choices
(74/90 ≈ 0.82). (A one sided test of equality of proportions yields p < 0.001.) This finding has
to be interpreted with some care, however, in concluding that there exists a significant amount of
aversion to lying. It may be possible that some of our subjects do not tell the truth not because
of aversion to lying, but rather because of strategic considerations in that they may expect the
receiver to choose the option that was not recommended.13 We discuss the matter of expectations
in more detail in section V, but note for now that one half (15/30) of the selfish subjects who expect
the receiver to follow the recommendation do not tell a lie. In this sense, a significant number of
subjects reveal an aversion to lying, confirming Gneezy’s observation.14
The percentage of liars in treatments 4 and 5 are 38 percent (22/58) and 47 percent (15/32)
respectively. This difference is not statistically significant: testing the hypothesis of equal propor-
tions of liars versus the alternative hypothesis of a lower proportion of liars in treatment 4 yields a
p-value of p = 0.20. When focussing only on the subset of players who are selfish, we find that the
fractions of liars are 43 percent (19/44) and 47 percent (14/30), respectively. These percentages are
not significantly different either: a one-sided test of equal proportions yields a p-value of p = 0.38.15
These percentages are not significantly different from 50 either, so we must conclude that one still
13Sutter (2006) runs similar experiments in Germany, and shows that a significant number of his subjects tell the
truth that option A earns the receiver more money than option B, but expect the receiver to not believe them, thereby
anticipating that option B will be chosen. However, he does not run the control dictator games, and it is thus not
known whether these sender subjects actually prefer option B over A or not.
14If there were no aversion to lying, then none of the selfish subjects who expect the receiver to follow their
recommendation should tell the truth. Even a single observation of such a subject telling the truth rejects the strict
null hypothesis that there is no aversion to lying. The fact that we find 15 out of 30 such subjects telling the truth
implies that we can even reject the hypothesis that only 80 percent or more of people have no aversion to lying
(p < 0.001). Alternatively, this can be interpreted as rejecting the hypothesis of no aversion to lying even if subjects
are assumed to choose with errors of up to 20 percent.
15Note that, if one only had coinciding data that were generated from subjects playing either the deception game or
the dictator game (but not both), one would have estimated that 50 percent of the selfish subjects would lie, in both
treatments. Namely, in treatment 4 there would have been 44 selfish subjects, and 22 liars while in treatment 5 there
would be 30 selfish subjects, and 15 liars. Our experimental design allowed us to observe some difference between
treatments, but this difference is not statistically significant.
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cannot reject the main Hypothesis we set out to test.
This came as a surprise to us. Based on Gneezy’s data, we anticipated that our subject pool
was big enough to yield significant differences in the fraction of selfish people who lie in our two
treatments. We now turn to analyzing why this was not the case. While one possibility is that
the Hypothesis is simply an accurate description of lying aversion for our subjects, we argue that
receivers in our subject pool are far less trusting of the sender’s message, and therefore, the incentives
to lie are much attenuated for our subjects relative to Gneezy’s.
V. Receiver Beliefs and Sender Expectations
Let us first discuss the behavior of receivers in our experiment. Since the information given to a
subject in the role of receiver is identical in both treatments, we find it reasonable to pool the data
from both treatments for this purpose. Based on the realization of random matches, 59 out of 90
subjects (66 percent) chose the option that player one (sender) said would give a higher monetary
payoff to player two (receiver). The other 31 out of 90 subjects (34 percent) chose the other option.
In this sense, only 66 percent of 90 subjects followed the “recommendation”, compared to the 78
percent of 225 subjects reported in Gneezy’s experiments. This is a statistically significant difference:
the null hypothesis of equal proportions versus the alternative hypothesis of less “recommendation
following” in our experiment yields a p-value of p = 0.012.
Since player two receives almost no information in either experiment, the differences in design
between our experiment and Gneezy’s experiment for player two are minimal. One difference is that
in our set-up, each subject knew that she was involved in two situations, the dictator game and the
deception game.16 It is possible that subjects perceive the deception game differently after having
“played” the dictator game, though we emphasize that no feedback occurred during the experiment.
Nevertheless, we controlled for this possibility by randomizing the order in which the two games
were played and find no significant differences. Another difference in design is that we used the
strategy method, that is, the receiver had to indicate his choice after both possible messages. Our
method reveals that a large number of subjects, 31 (34 percent), choose to ignore the message and
simply pick the same option regardless of the message received. This immediately suggests some
distrust of the senders on the part of receivers. Notice that even in Gneezy’s experiment, some
subjects may also have chosen to ignore the message. However, this could not be observed because
Gneezy used the direct response method, and in his analysis these subjects are either classified as
people who follow the recommendation or do the opposite by picking the option not recommended.
Since we see no intuitive reason why the strategy method would influence the behavior of receivers
in the current context (see fn. 11), we conclude that it is differences in the subject pools that are
responsible for the significantly lower level of recommendation-following in our data compared to
Gneezy’s.
Let us now discuss the behavior of senders. An important question is whether subjects, in the
16Note that we avoided the use of these terms (“dictator” and “deception”) in describing the situations to our
experimental subjects, using neutral ones instead.
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role of the sender, had a good estimate of how the receivers would act. As mentioned before, the
strategy method employed for player two reveals that a large number of receivers, 31 (34 percent),
choose to ignore the message and simply pick the same option regardless of the message received.
Another 15 subjects (17 percent) choose the option not recommended, i.e. invert the message or
recommendation. Subjects in the role of the sender who foresee that their message has no influence
will prefer to tell the truth if lying imposes an inherent cost on them. This holds both for selfish
and generous subjects. Selfish senders who foresee that their message may be inverted may also
prefer to send the true message indicating that option A is better for the responder, hoping that the
distrustful responder responds by choosing option B.
We asked subjects in the role of sender (player one) which option they thought the receiver
would choose based upon the message actually chosen to send. They could choose between saying
that they expected A to be chosen, B to be chosen, or they were unsure.17 Table 4 reports the
expectations of the senders.
Table 4—Expectations of senders
Expected reply Trust Unsure Invert
Treatment 4 27 11 20
Treatment 5 11 11 10
A sender is classified as expecting “Trust” if he expects the receiver to choose the option that he
says will give the receiver the highest monetary payoff. A sender is classified as expecting “Invert”
if he believes the receiver will choose the option not recommended. The remaining subjects are
classified as “Unsure”.
In the following we will assume that a sender who expects that his recommendation will be
followed did also believe that the other recommendation would also be followed.18 Similarly, we
assume that a sender who expects that his recommendation will be inverted, did also believe that
the other recommendation would also be inverted. We interpret an answer of “unsure” that the
sender attaches equal probabilities to option A or B after any message. Under these assumptions
the average sender would believe the recommendation to be followed in treatment 4 by 56 percent
of the receivers and in treatment 5 by 52 percent. This difference is not statistically significant.19
17We included this third “unsure” option in order to distinguish the subjects who are very confident that their
recommendation will be followed or inverted from those subjects who are not very sure.
18One might worry that this is not justified. That is, a sender who reports that he expects the receiver to choose
option A after the message “Option A earns you more money than option B” may believe that the sender will choose
option A in any case, or he may believe that the sender would have chosen option B in case he had sent the message
“Option B earns you more money than option A”. In the first two sessions we ran, we did not ask senders to report
their beliefs about the reaction of the sender to the message that was not actually sent. Given the observation that
many receivers chose a constant strategy, we wondered whether senders did foresee such reactions. In the third
session we did therefore include a question about the hypothetical reaction to the unsent message. It turned out only
1 out of 30 subjects expected his message to be ignored. All other subjects were consistent in the sense that they
expected the same reaction (trust, invert, or unsure) for both messages. This justifies our classification methodology.
19Testing the null-hypothesis of equal proportions of “trust” versus the alternative hypothesis of less trust in
treatment 4 yields a p-value of p = 0.37.
11
Pooling the two treatments, we obtain 54 percent. This is significantly lower than the expectation
of 82 percent that the subjects in Gneezy reported.20 Quite remarkably, the expectations of the
senders and the actual responses are quite close. (Namely, 54 versus 66 percent in our experiments,
and 82 versus 78 percent in Gneezy. The percentages of expected and actual responses are not
significantly different.) It appears that there is some population-specific but well-calibrated level of
trust and expected trust across the two subject pools.
The lower ex ante probability that a lie will work may explain a lower proportion of lies in
our experiment. This in turn makes it harder to derive a statistically significant difference in the
proportion of lies among selfish subjects between the two treatments, because of the smaller number
of selfish subjects who expect the lie to work. Recall that the discussion sofar followed Gneezy in
assuming that almost all subjects expect lies to work, that is, telling a lie in the deception game is
considered equivalent to choosing B. Since the data reveal that the average sender expects to be
trusted in only 54 percent of the cases, there may be many senders who actually expect the receiver
to take the option that was not recommended. Our examination of lying aversion should therefore
be restricted to those selfish subjects that expect the lie to work. Since we asked all senders about
their expectations, we can distinguish between senders who expect to be trusted, to be inverted, and
senders that are unsure. Table 5 reports the absolute number of cases of selfish subjects who lied
and told the truth in the deception game.21 (This table excludes the single subject who was selfish
and expected his message to be ignored. This subject chose to tell the truth.)
Table 5—Lies by Expectations of Selfish Subjects
Expected reply Trust Unsure Invert
Lie Truth Lie Truth Lie Truth
Treatment 4 8 12 3 4 8 8
Treatment 5 7 3 2 8 5 5
The data clearly show that among the selfish senders who expect to be believed, a significant
proportion (15/30) do tell the truth and thus exhibit behavior consistent with aversion to lying.
There is also a noticeable difference between treatments 4 and 5 for those senders. In treatment
4, 8 out of 20 lie while in treatment 5, 7 out of 10 lie. However, because of the small number of
observations in this subclass of selfish senders who expect lies to induce option B, this difference (40
versus 70 percent) is not statistically significant a the 10 percent level. The one-sided Fisher Exact
test yields a p-value of p = 0.123.
In treatment 5 there were many unsure senders and 8 out of 10 chose to tell the truth. This
certainly seems to be consistent with some cost of lying, which makes telling the truth optimal for
such senders. What is quite surprising is that of the selfish senders who expect to be inverted,
20The p-value for testing the null-hypothesis of equal proportions versus the alternative hypothesis of lower expec-
tations of trust in our experiments yields p < 0.001.
21Given the low number of generous subjects, especially in treatment 5, we abstain from discussing the behavior
and expectations of generous subjects in detail.
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half lie and the other half tell the truth. There seems to be no difference in the lying behavior for
such senders between the two treatments. One would expect a rational selfish sender with such
expectations to tell the truth, as this will yield him the preferred outcome (option B). However, half
the subjects lie, which hurts them, even if lying itself is not assumed to be costly. Their behavior is
thus somewhat puzzling to us, but given the small number of such subjects, we resist from drawing
any interpretations.
VI. Conclusion
Gneezy (2005) shows convincingly that not all people are willing to use a lie to obtain their favorite
outcome. However, his claim that people are more likely to lie when they can gain more and the
partner loses less conflates distributional preferences and aversion to lying. Our main point in this
note is that the relevant probabilities of lying are those that are conditioned on having an incentive
to lie. Doing this with Gneezy’s data does not yield statistically significant support for his claim.
As it is important to know how people’s decisions with respect to lying depends on the con-
sequences even when conditioned on merely preferring the outcome from lying, we ran additional
experiments in Spain with a design that allows for the conditioning, and that uses more polarized
treatments than Gneezy. Despite this, we do not find statistical significant support for Gneezy’s
claim. We found that our subjects in Spain are much less willing to follow the recommendations
they receive. Instead, recommendations are often ignored or even inverted. Our senders seem
to be aware of this possibility that lies will often not be believed and thus not work. Those that
expect a lie to work are indeed more likely to use it when the gain is high and the loss to the
partner is low (see Table 5). However, since relatively few subjects have these beliefs, we have a
small number of observations so that the difference observed is not statistically significant. Further
sessions could possibly yield a statistically significant difference, but we believe it is preferable to
use a different and more efficient design, since in treatment 5, for example, 60 subjects yielded only
10 useful observations of this type. Other questions that deserve further investigation concern the
behavior of the generous subjects. Will a generous person lie to his partner when he expects not to
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In this Appendix we give details of the calculations performed in Section III.
Conditional probabilities. Formally, let pi denote the probability that a subject in treatment
i who actually prefers Bi over Ai will choose to lie. Assume that persons who have no incentive to
lie will not do so. Finally, assume that the probability qi of having an incentive to lie in treatment i
is exactly equal to the estimate given by the data of the dictator games. Hence, q1 = 0.66, q2 = 0.42,
q3 = 0.9. Let X¯i denote the frequency of subjects lying in the deception game in treatment i. Below,
we use Φ to denote the cdf of a standard Normal (mean 0, variance 1) distribution.
For the comparison of treatment 2 versus 3, note that under the null hypothesis of equal con-
ditional proportions, we have p2 = p3 = pˆ23 = (13 + 39)/(75q2 + 75q3) = 52/99 ≈ 0.525. Under
the null hypothesis, X¯3 − X¯2 would be approximately Normal with mean pˆ23(q3 − q2) = 0.252 and
variance [pˆ23q3(1 − pˆ23q3) + pˆ23q2(1 − pˆ23q2)]/75 = 0.0056159. Hence, P (X¯3 − X¯2 > 26/75) =
1−Φ((0.35− 0.252)/√0.0056159) = 1−Φ(1.26) = 0.104. The p-value equals 0.104 and one cannot
reject the null hypothesis at the ten percent level.
Treatment 1 versus 2: pˆ12 = (27+13)/(75q1+75q2) = 40/81 ≈ 0.494. Under the null hypothesis,
X¯1 − X¯2 would be approximately Normal with mean pˆ12(q1 − q2) = 16/135 = 0.118 and variance
[pˆ12q1(1− pˆ12q1)+ pˆ12q2(1− pˆ12q2)]/75 = 0.00512117. Hence, P (X¯1− X¯2 > 14/75) ≈ 1−Φ((0.186−
0.118)/
√
0.00512117) = 1 − Φ(0.95) = 0.171. The p-value equals 0.171 and one cannot reject the
null hypothesis at the ten percent level.
Treatment 1 versus 3: pˆ13 = (27 + 39)/(75q1 + 75q3) = 22/39 ≈ 0.564. Under the null hy-
pothesis, X¯3 − X¯1 would be approximately Normal with mean pˆ13(q3 − q1) = 0.135 and vari-
ance [pˆ13q1(1 − pˆ13q1) + pˆ13q3(1 − pˆ13q3)]/75 = 0.00644847. Hence, P (X¯3 − X¯1 > 12/75) ≈
1 − Φ((12/75 − 0.135)/√0.00644847) = 1 − Φ(0.31) = 0.382. The p-value equals 0.382 and one
cannot reject the null hypothesis at the ten percent level.
Difference in difference regression.
For the comparison of Treatments 1 and 2, we run a linear regression of the form
Y = a+ b DEC+ c TR2 + d DEC*TR2,
where Y denotes the fraction of lies (in the deception game) or selfish B choices (in the dictator
game), a is a constant, DEC is a dummy variable taking value 1 in case of the deception game, and
TR2 is a dummy variable taking value 1 in case of Treatment 2.
The following table reports the result of this regression; the important point being that the
coefficient on DEC ∗ TR2 is not significant (even at a 60 percent level):
Variable Coefficient Standard error t P > |t|
Constant +0.660 0.065 +10.21 0.000
DEC −0.300 0.083 −3.59 0.000
TR2 −0.240 0.091 −2.62 0.009
DEC*TR2 +0.053 0.118 +0.45 0.652
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For the comparison of Treatments 2 and 3, we run a linear regression of the form
Y = a+ b DEC+ c TR3 + d DEC*TR3,
where Y denotes the fraction of lies (in the deception game) or selfish B choices (in the dictator
game), a is a constant, DEC is a dummy variable taking value 1 in case of the deception game, and
TR3 is a dummy variable taking value 1 in case of Treatment 3.
The following table reports the result of this regression; the important point being that the
coefficient on DEC ∗ TR3 is not significant (even at a 20 percent level):
Variable Coefficient Standard error t P > |t|
Constant +0.420 0.060 +6.86 0.000
DEC −0.247 0.079 −3.12 0.002
TR3 +0.480 0.087 +5.54 0.000
DEC*TR3 −0.133 0.112 −1.19 0.234
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